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We begin with a modest claim - or rather with the citation of one. "The diary of Alice 
James, invalid sister of the psychologist William and of the novelist Henry, represents 
her modest claim on posterity beside the works of her famous brothers."' This claim for 
Alice James, made in her name, opens Leon Edel's preface to his edition of the diary. 
The attribution of modesty comes as no surprise, and is entirely in keeping with the stan- 
dard critical apologies for the diary and the surviving letters that, together with her 
commonplace book, complete this circumscribed body of work, these "thoughtful notes of 
a daughter and a sister," as Edel calls them - in keeping with their devaluation and practi- 
cally their invalidation on the grounds of their authorship by the invalid younger sister 
whose "claim to attention" at the time of the diary's first publication in 1934 "was still as 
an appendage to brothers."* The "modesty" assigned reflects the relegation to marginal 
status of a corpus that, so the argument goes, pales beside the monumental achievements, 
scientific and aesthetic, of William and Henry. In generic terms as well, this slight auto- 
biographical oezlvre is taken to mark a decidedly minor event in American letters: indeed, 
Alice James's sole publication prior to her death was a letter, an anecdotal note to  the edi- 
tor of The Nation signed "Invalid." 
The predictable premises of this relegation to modest, marginal, and minor status 
have been challenged of late in attentive interpretations of the journal and letters on the 
part of Ruth Bernard Yeazell and Raymond Bellour, as well as in briefer critical interven- 
tions by Mary Jacobus and Jacqueline Rose. Yeazell's introduction to her edition of the 
letters, for example, tacitly amends Edel's assessment of the diary's modest claim, to read: 
"Alice claims our attention less in spite of her invalidism than because of it, and she 
claims it with a distinctively Jamesian energy."3 Critics spanning several generations and 
theoretical positions thus acknowledge that some claim is being made, "on posterity," 
which is to say on "our attention" as readers, as the diary's posthumous addressees. (One 
of the journal's first readers, Henry James himself, noted in a letter to William following 
their sister's death that "her style, her power to write," "constitute (I wholly agree 
with you) a new claim for the family r e n ~ w n . " ~  But what happens when we interrogate 
further this discourse of claiming, in an attempt to specify the nature, the object, and the 
validity of a demand that is in fact asserted immodestly, with force (Alice James's word is 
"potency"), and even with a certain "violence" (again, her term), in the pages of the jour- 
nal? While Edel (to cite him once more as an instance of a critical commonplace in the 
accounts of the corpus) notes summarily that "the claim of life against the claim of death 
- this is the assertion of every page of Alice's diary,"5 a reconsideration of those pages 
suggests rather that Alice James's diary breaks with the opposirional logic of life against 
death, and deliberately reinscribes its terms - as it does with the same logic brought to 
bear on the categories of gender and health. The diary disrupts, that is, the very system 
that would guarantee its relegation (as the private record of a woman's - a daughter's, a 
sister's - illness) to modest, minor, marginal status in the first place. 
Among the crucial junctures in this text that consistently works to preempt its own 
invalidation is the moment when Alice James's long-awaited death sentence is finally 
pronounced, in no uncertain terms. As Yeazell observes, over the course of more than 
twenty years of attempted treatments, tentative recoveries, and inevitable relapses, the 
career invalid had weathered a succession of indeterminate diagnoses and impalpable 
prognoses.6 The diagnoses ranged from "nervous hyperaesthesia" to "spinal neurosis"' to 
"an abnormally sensitive nervous organization"' to her mother's judgement around the 
time of James's first breakdown: "It is a case of genuine hysteria for which no cause as yet 
can be discovered. It is a most distressing form of illness, and the most difficult to reach, 
because little is known about it."9 (The latter diagnosis is problematic in a way that Rose 
elucidates: "To describe Alice as aln) hysteric is of course a problem. We can list her con- 
stantly redefined and reexperienced ills - paralysis, suppressed gout, cramps of the stom- 
ach and what she called cramps of the mind, sick headaches, toppling over and fainting 
out. But we are forced to acknowledge that, in William James's words, this disease 'with 
no definite symptoms' . . . resides, above all, in its designation as hysteria.")10 And a long his- 
tory of prognoses could be summarized by the patient herself: "And then these doctors 
tell you that you will die, or recover! But you don't recover. I have been at these alternations 
since I was nineteen and am neither dead nor recovered - as I am now forty-two there has 
surely been time for either process."" But between the eitherlor of the doctors' logical 
code, an unequivocal diagnosis and prognosis are, in time, delivered: 
To him who waits, all things come! My aspirations may have been eccentric, but I cannot 
complain now, that they have not been brilliantly fulfilled. Ever since I have been ill, I have 
longed and longed for some palpable disease, no matter how conventionally dreadful a label 
it might have. . . . I have been going downhill at a steady trot; so they sent for Sir Andrew 
Clark four days ago, and the blessed being has endowed me not only with cardiac complica- 
tions, but says that a lump that I have had in one of my breasts for three months, which has 
given me a great deal of pain, is a tumour, that nothing can be done for me but to alleviate 
pain, that it is only a question of time, etc.'* 
Far from occasioning dread or terror, Sir Andrew's "uncompromising verdict," as James 
terms it, has the salutary effect of "lifting us out of the formless vague and setting us 
within the very heart of the sustaining concrete" - the very heart of the concrete cast as 
"this unholy granite substance in my breast."13 
Yet to Alice James, avid reader of George Sand and her "beloved" Jules Lemaitre, 
whose diary is a tissue of citations from the French, "tumour" may well have sounded as 
a brutal, even if welcome, judgement.14 For the physician's verdict, addressed to her with 
a certain familiarity, has a complex rhetorical and temporal status: it tells the truth, dit 
La vei.iti, accurately describes a state of affairs in the present (tu mears: you are dying), while 
it also prescribes, in the tension of this present tense, a future (tu mears: you must die, 
you shall die). The verdict, then, is also a sentence, a sentencing. And however idiomatic 
and untranslatable, Alice James hears and understands it as such: in particularizing 
her ailment, the terrible apostrophe posits the law of her life, a law that, over time, will 
enforce itself as reference.15 
This parsing of the cruel diagnosis may help us to bring into focus the outlook afforded 
in the physician's superfluous gloss, whose very generality of formulation makes it para- 
digmatic as prognosis.16 If it is "only a question of time, etc." for Alice James - who lives 
on, a long nine months after the verdict is delivered, and before she is delivered to her 
death - the temporality of the diary (a genre or mode conventionally associated with the 
present tense, with writing-to-the-moment) is consistently unpresentable, surpassing the 
present, staking in effect a counterclaim against her father's assessment, in his essay 
"Woman and the 'Woman's Movement,' " of the "question of time" as it properly pertains 
to woman: "The very virtue of woman [is) her practical sense, which leaves her indifferent 
to past and future alike, and keeps her the busy blessing of the present hour. . . . "l7 Far 
from being unmindful of the past and future, Alice James is if anything practically oblivi- 
ous of the present hour, as she confesses in a letter to William: 
It seems sad to think of you with yr. love of kin left alone in Cambridge with the family 
melted like snow from about you, but our dead are among les marts qui font toujours vivants. 
Your wife allies you to the present [an allusion, here, to the other Alice, and an echo of the 
father's thesis) & your children to the future, but I live altogether in the past, I have a momen- 
tary & spasmodic consciousness of the present. . . . I8 
What then are the terms of this preoccupation with the past on James's part? The 
diary as well as the letters are first of all the site of a memory-work and its peculiar 
tropology, in which death figures time and again - the locus of an effort to come to grips 
with her history in what amounts to a struggle for survival ("What is living in this 
deadness called life," she writes, "is the struggle of the creature in the grip of its inheri- 
tance and against the consequences of its acts.")19 From the vantage point of a "moment of 
middle life" that, ironically, would prove much nearer the end, the journal ostensibly 
seeks to reclaim a sense of the past as a basis for self-understanding: 
And what joys of youth equal this blessed moment of middle life, when serene and sure of 
our direction all the simple incidents of daily life and human complication explain and enrich 
themselves as they are linked and fitted to the wealth of past experience. Whilst the blank 
youthful mind, ignorant of catastrophe, stands crushed and bewildered before the perpetual 
postponement of its hopes, things promised in the dawn that the sunset ne'er fulfils. 
More specifically, as she goes on to note, 
Owing to muscular circumstances my youth was not of the most ardent, but I had to peg away 
pretty hard between 12 and 24, "killing myself," as some one calls it - absorbing into the bone 
that the better part is to  clothe oneself in neutral tints, walk by still waters, and possess one's 
soul in silence. How I recall the low grey Newport sky in that winter of 62-3 as I used to wan- 
der about over the cliffs, my young soul struggling out of its swaddling-clothes as the knowl- 
edge crystallized within me of what Life meant for me, one simple, single and before which all 
mystery vanished. A spark then kindled which every experience great and small has fed into a 
steady flame which has illuminated my little journey and which, altho' it may have burned 
low as the waters rose, has never flickered out - "une pensee, unique eternelle, toujours melie, 
a I'heure prisente." How profoundly grateful I am for the temperament which saves from the 
wretched fate of those poor creatures who never find their bearings, but are tossed like dryed 
leaves hither, thither and yon at the mercy of every event which o'ertakes them. Who feel no 
shame at being vanquished, or at crying out at the common lot of pain and sorrow, who never 
dimly suspect that the only thing which survives is the resistance we bring to life and not the 
strain life brings to us.20 
The considerable stakes of such a passage are to establish and affirm the continuity of 
past experience with a present that, while it is not the future projected by the struggling 
young soul - while it was not to have been predicted - is yet part of a coherent history, 
and, as such, meaningful. The life lesson recounted here ("one simple, single") seems 
amenable to straightforward narrative rendering, to "crystallization" as knowledge and as 
memory, on the model of an interiorizing ("within me") and idealizing recollection or 
Erinnerzlng. But the meaning ostensibly made available here is not independent of the 
diary's characteristic figuration, in which, again, death is the presiding trope. Here as 
elsewhere, the relationship between the text's apparent thematic statement and its rhetor- 
ical operation is not simple, single, or straightforward. In this "memory of her youth as 
an exercise in self-destr~ction,"~' Alice James recalls the past in terms of "'killing 
{herlself,' as some one calls it." Given the elaboration, over the course of what she calls her 
"mortal career," of her project of 'getting myself dead - the hardest job of all," the 
metaphorical suicide alluded to here is not one figure among others - nor is it simply a fig- 
ure, given its eventual p e r f ~ r m a t i v i t ~ . ~ ~  If the passage lays claim to continuity, to the 
possibility of "linkring] and fit{tingln past experience to "daily life and human complica- 
tion" in the present, that continuity rests uneasily upon a tropology of memory that, once 
again, confuses what we take to be the conditions of life and death. As Alice James goes 
on to assert, what "survives"23 the passage from then to now - "the only thing" to do so - 
is "the resistance we bring to life": a formulation that is itself a locus of resistance in more 
senses than one. In his preface to What Maisie Knew, Henry James raises the "question 
of the particular kind of truth of resistance I might be able to impute to my central figure 
-some intensity, some continuity of resistance being naturally of the essence of the sub- 
j e~ t . " ' ~  If a certain "truth of resistance" might be imputed to the figure of the invalid sis- 
ter, read in the text of her diary, what particular kind would it be? What is being resisted 
in such a passage, and in the name of what? 
The syntactical symmetry of the chiasmus - "the only thing which survives is the 
resistance we bring to life and not the strain life brings to us" - initially suggests that we 
understand this resistance as a resource, as the force we marshal1 in life, in what Alice 
James takes to be our "struggle.. . in the grip of {our) inheritance and against the conse- 
quences of {our) acts": resistance, then, on the analogy of an attribute of matter, as what 
keeps it (and us) from being "tossed like dryed leaves.. .a t  the mercy of every event which 
o'ertakes" us.25 The epistemological stakes of such a reading are apparent if we recall 
the fundamental Aristotelian formulation in which matter becomes cognizable precisely 
through the resistance it affords; it is through their resistance that we come to know physi- 
cal objects.26 Such an understanding is apparently borne out in another symmetrical for- 
mulation in the letters: "Surely there is nothing so true as that we are simply at the mercy 
of what we bring to life and not what life brings to us."27 But while Alice James's career 
is arguably a life of resistance in this sense, the passage in question is liable to other read- 
ings as well, readings that complicate a response to the question posed in the preface to 
Maisie: "successfully to resist.. .what would that be?"28 The apparent symmetry afforded 
by the grammatical figure, and the totalizing understanding that chiasmus seems to war- 
rant, are upset by the rhetorical opening onto other possible senses, likewise justified by 
the text. In other words, the grammatical determination of the meaning of the figure 
leaves something unaccounted for (in a version of what William James, in an essay that 
Alice glosses in the diary, calls an "Unclassified R e ~ i d u u m " ) . ~ ~  
For "the resistance we bring to life" might also be read as resistance opposed t o  life, in 
the name of death. Alice James writes that she "aspires" to die (her word), that she lives 
(and writes)for the eventuality of her death, which finally materializes in the anticipated 
"mortuary moment." Such resistance finds expression in the epitaphic tonality that 
prevails from early on in the diary.30 Or  again, "the resistance we bring to life" might be 
thought of as the resistance we animate or reanimate, as we might the dead. In this 
instance, the crucial figure in the rhetoric of memory would be, not the grammatical chi- 
asmus, but personification or ptosopopoeia, which gives "life" to the dead, and hence 
functions crucially in autobiographical as well as epitaphic d i sc~urse .~ '  In question, then, 
would be a resistance that language, in its rhetorical function as prosopopoeia, brings, 
figuratively speaking, to "life."32 Rhetoric thus resists the grammatical decoding of mean- 
ing in the language of this formulation, to  open up multiple possibilities that call for 
a reading of this resistance, for reading as the resistance to a determination of sense that 
would ignore the divergence between the text's grammatical and rhetorical operations. 
The scheme just outlined must accommodate a further characteristic complication in 
the diary passage, for it is not only her own past that is figured in terms of "killing her- 
self" (later she will confess, "The fact is, I have been dead so long and it has been simply 
such a grim shoving of the hours behind me as I faced a ceaseless possible horror. . . ").33 
Indeed, the very pastness of the past is figured by death, and more specifically, figured in 
the person of the dead friend, the dead parent, called up like a ghost to haunt the text: for 
example, in a recollected scene of reading that opens onto an encounter with the past. The 
diary entry for 29 January 1890 begins with Alice's ironic venting of her irritation at being 
overlooked by a flu epidemic; since "there is no hope of my sowing a microbe," she writes, 
it seems death is to be postponed yet again. "My being, however," she goes on to recount, 
has been stirred to its depths by what I might call ghost microbes imported in my Davenport 
which came from home ten days ago. In it were my old letters. I fell upon Father and Mother's 
and could not tear myself away from them for two days. One of the most intense, exquisite 
and profoundly interesting experiences I ever had. I think if I try a little and give it form its 
vague intensity will take limits to itself, and the "divine anguish" of the myriad memories 
stirred grow less. Altho' they were as the breath of life to me as the years have passed they have 
always been as present as they were at first and [will be for} the rest of my numbered days, 
with their little definite portion of friction and serenity, so short a span, until we three were 
blended together again, if such should be our spiritual necessity. But as I read it seemed as if I 
had opened up a post-script of the past and that I had had, in order to find them trzlly, really 
to lose them. . . . Mother died Sunday evening, January 29th, 1882, Father on Monday mid- 
day, December 19th, 1882, and now I am shedding the tears I didn't shed then!34 
The formalizing gesture in this passage ("I think if I try a little and give it form. . . ") cor- 
responds to the stated function of the diary more generally as one of imposing limits on 
the flux, the "vague intensity" of recollected experience. (Formalization is also, as we have 
seen, the effect of the doctor's diagnosis, the verdict - "tumour" - that releases Alice from 
the "formless vague.") The scene of reading intervenes to transform a more complacent 
sense of the past expressed earlier in the journal: "Mr Howells letter made me so happy by 
saying that mine had made mother and father seem living to him. No greater happiness 
can come than finding that they survive, or can be revived, in a few m e m ~ r i e s . " ~ ~  But what 
survive, what are revived with the opening of the Davenport, are mere 'ghost microbes," 
so many phantom proxies whose resistance to appropriation by bereaved memory (and 
even by Alice's "floating particle sense")36 is a function of their virtual immateriality as 
well as their ephemerality. Once again, the diary's turn of phrase breaks with the opposi- 
tional logic of life versus death: the microbes are indeed death-bearing, but the death in 
question animates, enlivens the invalid reader. 
If reading these phantomized missives, addressed to her from before and beyond the 
grave, seems to open up a postscript of the past, it may be that reading (and writing) the 
past can only take place as such an afterthought, whose relation to that past is allegorical, 
alluding to an anteriority which, while determinant for our "momentary and spasmodic 
consciousness of the present," cannot be recovered as presence, recuperated as knowledge 
(on the model of the self-knowledge of a self-present, self-identical subject), nor as mem- 
ory conceived, after Hegel and after Freud, as the appropriation of dialectical Erinnerung. 
In the belated, postscriptive mourning that takes place here - "now I am shedding the 
tears I didn't shed then!" - memory comes to terms with a certain otherness, with the rad- 
ical alterity of the past aspast, as figured in the dead (in something like the way that, in 
The Portrait of a Lady, it is figured in the "absent eyes and alien lips" of the Greek statues 
tkat Isabel contemplates in R ~ m e ) . ~ '  Death divides the living from this past, rendering it 
absolute, irreducible to any form of presence: a past from which the dead will never return 
except as revenant, as insubstantial and fleeting phantom proxy; a past to which they are 
irretrievably lost. The imperative "really to lose" her mother and father is the imperative 
to leave them (to) their otherness, to abandon the project of mourning as assimilation and 
prescriptive closure. 
All this may help us to read the ways in which the diary inscribes this right of the 
other to death - its engagement, from early on, in a mourning that would respect the 
other's infinite remove. Such a respect underlies the passages in which Alice James mocks 
the mystified memorializing practices of her acquaintances: "Some friend was gushing to 
Kratharine) over Mrs Charles Kingsley's devotion to the memory of her husband, and gave 
in proof of it, that she always sat beside his bust and had his photo pinned to the adjoin- 
ing pillow; as the last expression of refined spiritual sentiment, could anything be more 
grotesquely l ~ a t h s o m e . " ~ ~  Alice James's respect for the memory of her dead - to the 
extent they can still be said to be "hers" - resists the seductions of proximity ("sat beside," 
"adjoining pillow") and mimetic fidelity ("his bust," "his photo"), taking a different turn: 
Constance Maud told me of her sorrow at some moment when it was thought that her Mother 
was dying and how she prayed to God to spare her life - the sincerity and strength of the feel- 
ing which she showed increased the shocked sense which filled me as I listened. One cries out, 
bowed down in supplication, for strength, but how can any creature. . .propose to make her 
paltry necessities an element for the modification of another's destiny. . . . I remember how 
horrified I was to the core of my being when some said to me that in the month when Father 
lay dying, refusing to eat, that I must urge him and tell him that he must eat for my sake!!39 
The same line of argument appears in the letters as well: "We were so glad," she recalls, 
"to have him go and that he was not kept in weariness & desolation any longer after 
Mother's death that we could give no thought to our own loss."40 
What amounts to the assertion of a claim to the other's right to a death that no longer, 
strictly speaking, concerns the living is even more emphatic with respect to Alice's mem- 
ory of her mother's death, an increasing preoccupation as her own end draws near. In a 
passage written after the diagnosis of her cancer, Alice reflects that an old friend's consol- 
ing words are, at  this late stage, beside the point: 
How little all assurances of one's own immortality seem to concern one, now. . . . References to 
those whom we shall meet again make me shiver, as such an invasion of their sanctity, gone so 
far beyond, for ever since the night that Mother died, and the depth of filial tenderness was 
revealed to me, all personal claim upon her vanished, and she has dwelt in my mind a beautiful 
illumined memory, the essence of divine maternity from which I was to learn great things, 
give all, but ask nothing.41 
When all personal claim, on the part of the living, vanishes in the void, no possibility 
remains of transaction, of reciprocity between the dead and those left to mourn them. 
Thus Alice reserves special scorn for the figure of the "medium," whose claim to com- 
municate with the dead and gone promises what proves an impossible passage. As she 
notes in the journal a week before her death, 
It is taken for granted apparently that I shall be spiritualized into a "district messenger," for 
here comes another message for Father and Mother; imagine my dragging them, of whom I 
can only think as a sublimation of their qualities, into gossip about the little more or the little 
less faith of Tom, Dick or Harry. I do pray to heaven that the dreadful Mrs. Piper [a famous 
Boston medium whom William James researched over a period of twenty years) won't be let 
loose upon my defenceless soul. I suppose the thing "medium" has done more to degrade spiri- 
tual conception than the grossest forms of materialism or idolatry. . . . 42 
And when William goes so far as to request a lock of Alice's hair to transmit to Mrs. Piper, 
she is not entirely defenceless, as she subsequently advises him by letter: "I hope you wont 
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be 'offended'. . . when I tell you that I played you a base trick about the hair. I t  was a 
lock, not of my hair, but that of a friend of Miss Ward's who died four years ago. I thought 
it a much better test of whether the medium were simply a mind-reader or not, if she is 
something more I should greatly dislike to have the secrets of my organisation laid bare to 
a wondering public."43 The trick of substituting a lock of another's hair - the friend of a 
friend, already dead - throws a wrench into the works of a mediation in which she can 
have no faith. 
As this latter passage begins to suggest, Alice James's fierce respect for the right of the 
other to its difference and its history is intricated with her own sense of self-respect as 
other, as resistant to "invasion" and appropriation. From early on in the diary, she regis- 
ters shock at such attempts on the part of others unknown to her (to include any attempt 
by her prospective reader, whom she addresses as "dear ~ n c o n n u " ) : ~ ~  "Imagine hearing 
that someone here in Leamington whom I had never seen had said that I was 'very chari- 
table.' I felt as if all my clothes had been suddenly torn off and that I was standing on the 
steps of the Town Hall, in the nude, for the delectation of the British ~ a t r o n . " * ~  While 
this passage has been taken to reflect the "modesty," the repressed sexuality of the ageing 
virgin, the threat of violation may rather be understood to call up the corresponding 
energy of a certain resistance - a resistance to determining the relation to the other as 
unproblematically egological intersubjectivity. 
The resistance that Alice James brings to life - the only thing that survives - finds 
expression in the claim to her right to death as it comes to the other, and to her through 
the other on whom she renounces all personal claim. If the right to  death - the other's and 
her "own" - is the object of the claim staked by the diary, the rhetoric of claiming must 
itself respect a temporal imperative whose terms are nonnegotiable. Those terms, which 
affirm the allegorical structure of memory and mourning, dictate that death cannot take 
place now, but only then, in the (recollected) past of the other's death, in the (anticipated) 
future of one's own. This impossibility imposes itself most forcefully on the text of the 
diary in its account of the question of suicide, an act that represents the promise of death 
now, on one's own terms, in one's own time. "I shall proclaim," the invalid writes, "that 
any one who spends her life as an appendage to five cushions and three shawls is justified 
in committing the sloppiest kind of suicide at  a moment's notice."46 This claim to the 
right to "kill herself" at  a moment's notice (and even the time of this "notice" postpones 
the fatal moment) asks to be read in relation to another moment, from a time before the 
journal was undertaken. As her father recollects in a letter to his son Robertson written in 
1878, during the period of one of Alice's most severe breakdowns, when she was "half the 
time, indeed much more than half, on the verge of insanity and suicide," 
One day a long time ago.. . [she] asked me whether I thought that suicide, to which at tlmes 
she felt very strongly tempted, was a sin. I told her that I thought it was not a sin except 
where it was wanton, as when a person from a mere love of pleasurable excitement indulged in 
drink or opium to the utter degradation of his faculties and often to the ruin of the human 
form in him; but that it was absurd to think it sinful when one was driven to it in order to 
escape bitter suffering, from spiritual ~nflux, as in her case, or from some loathsome form of 
disease, as in others. I told her that so far as I was concerned she had my full permission to end 
her life whenever she pleased; only I hoped that if she ever felt like doing that sort of justice to 
her circumstances, she would do it in a perfectly gentle way In order not to distress her friends. 
She then remarked that she was very thankful to me, but she felt that now she could perceive 
it to be her right to dispose of her own body when life had become intolerable, she could never 
do it: that when she had felt tempted to do it, it  was with a view to break bonds, or assert her 
freedom, but that now I had given her freedom to do in the premises what she pleased, she was 
more than content to stay by my side, and battle in concert with me against the evil that is in 
the world. I dont fear suicide much since this conversation, though she often tells me that she 
is strongly tempted still.*' 
The temptation "violently [to discontinue} herself," as she elsewhere terms it,  meets with 
an  abstract reflection on suicide that culminates in the granting of paternal "permission 
to end her life whenever she pleased," of "her right to dispose of her own body when life 
had become intolerable." What is remarkable about the exchange recollected by Henry Sr. 
is the asymmetry between the question and the answer it prompts: Alice doesn't ask his 
permission - she rather inquires, with some measure of disinterest, whether suicide is a 
sin - but she gets it nonetheless. If afterward, in the father's phrase, "she could never do 
it," this impossibility may not be simply the effect of his disarming "lack of paternal resis- 
tance" incapacitating the daughter, emptying the tacit threat of its force48 - the strong 
temptation, after all, remains. Once more, a temporal imperative intervenes to postpone 
the possibility of death. Time and again, Alice James observes the terms of this imperative 
as she translates them in the diary: "the law that you cannot either escape or hasten the 
moment."49 ~ n d  in the letters: "the law that you can't hasten the moment, in any develop- 
ment."?' The "consequences" of the doctor's prognosis -"it is only a question of time" - thus 
unfold in reverse, shedding retrospective light on the text. Those consequences are brought 
home in another recollection, this time the daughter's of the father (the father who eventu- 
ally committed the kind of "perfectly gentle" suicide he recommended to Alice, by declin- 
ing to take nourishment over a period of months after the death of his wife). In another 
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haunting passage from the diary, Alice James confesses: "I can hear, as of yesterday, the ring 
of Father's voice, as he anathematized some shortcomings of mine in Newport one day: 'Oh, 
Alice, how hard you are!' and I can remember how penetrated I was, not for the first time,?* 
with the truth of it, and saw the repulsion his nature with its ripe kernal of human benig- 
nancy felt - alas! through all these years, that hard core confronts me 
The recollected ring of the father's apostrophe - "Oh, Alice, how hard you are!" - 
affords another instance of the complex temporality and rhetoricity we noted in the 
"uncompromising verdict" pronounced by Sir Andrew Clark. For it is at once descriptive 
of past and present inadequacies, in a description whose "truth" Alice acknowledges, 
and uncannily prescriptive, in the grammar of the present, of the future, precisely in the 
way that it anticipates the verdict, the other terrible apostrophe: "tu meurs." All unknow- 
ingly, the father diagnoses in advance the tumour, the "loathsome form of disease" that 
will catch up with Alice, "that hard core" that will confront her in the "unholy granite 
substance in {her) breast." 
A correlate of "the law that you can't hasten the moment, in any development" -the 
law according to which Alice James's history unfolds - is thus another imperative, one 
that demands the renunciation of all personal claim on the other, on the past as figured in 
the other, that she traces to the death of her mother. In the penultimate entry in the diary, 
dated six days before her own death, she writes: 
How wearing to the substance and exasperating to the nerves is the perpetual bewailing, won- 
dering at and wishing to alter things happened, as if all personal concern didn't vanish as the 
"happened" crystallizes into history. Of what matter can it be whether pain or pleasure has 
shaped and stamped the pulp within, as one is absorbed in the supreme interest of watching 
the outline and the tracery as the lines broaden for eternity.53 
Calmly confronting her impending death, Alice James renounces all remaining traces of 
personal concern with the past, and all desire to "alter things happened."54 And she voids 
in advance any such concern on the part of her survivors, any claim, however well mean- 
ing, they may seek to make on her history. As she writes to William, "So when I am gone, 
pray don't think of me simply as a creature who might have been something else had 
neurotic science been born."55 In the ironic mode characteristic of the letters and the jour- 
nal, sustained unto death, Alice James rejects the modal perfect of the might have 
been - what her other brother, under the rubric "operative irony," understood as "the pos- 
sible other case, the case rich and edifying where the actuality is pretentious and vain."56 
Hers are rather the terms of the verses of Christina Rossetti cited in a diary entry that 
goes on to incorporate a newspaper report of the death - by suicide - of a young woman 
jilted by her lover: 
When I am dead, my dearest, 
Sing no sad songs for me. 
Plant thou no roses at  my head 
Nor shady cypress tree. 
Be the green grass above me 
With showers and dewdrops wet; 
And if though wilt, remember, 
And if thou wilt, forget. 
Alice James's rigorous renunciation of the personal as well as the hypothetical, then, 
extends well beyond the limits of her own case, or any other case in particular. If she 
begins the diary with the idea of "writing a bit about what happens, or rather doesn't hap- 
pen,"57 as the first entry attests, what survives to the last is her absorbing interest in "the 
'happened"' as it "crystallizes into history." We might recall here that the career invalid 
had another profession as well, though it was short-lived: she conducted a correspondence 
course for the Society to Encourage Studies at Home, on the subject of history ("In attempt- 
ing to teach history," she informs a friend by letter, "I am not half the fool that I look.")58 
In the history lesson afforded by the diary, the "literary remains" addressed to her survivors 
("I feel sorry for you all, for I feel as if I hadn't yet given my message"),59 the "outline and 
the tracery" of the past - of the "happened" - do not assume the shape of a self's history. 
Situated at the vanishing point of all personal concern, all personal claim, at the limit 
of appropriation as knowledge or memory, history as the "happenedn- as what has 
occurred, what has taken place - does not appear in any recognizably organic, teleologi- 
cal, or dialectical form, nor as an empty abstraction or generality.60 It does, however, bear 
a certain resemblance to allegory, understood as the possibility that permits language, 
however provisionally, to say the other, to say the past as other, as determinant but 
irrecoverable for any here and now. And the marginal, minor, invalid historian begins 
oddly to resemble a figure from Walter Benjamin's third thesis on the concept of history: 
"A chronicler who recites events without distinguishing between major and minor ones, 
acts in accordance with the following truth: nothing that has ever happened should be 
regarded as lost for history."61 But the diarist - whose every word could be her last - 
resists this final attempt at appropriation by resemblance as well, for Alice James writes 
strictly in accordance with the terms of her own "postscript of the past": terms that 
respect the other's right to an other history, and dictate that the happened - the past as 
past - should be regarded as lost, "reully" lost, t o  history. 
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